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GUARANTEE AND REFLEXIVITY 
 
Abstract. The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious 
if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An 
account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers 
endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There 
is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-
conscious thoughts: GUARANTEE. Along the way, I will rebut a number of objections and 
introduce two constraints on how the reflexive rule is implemented. 
  
Keywords. I-thoughts; self-consciousness; I-concept; guarantee.   
 
According to a version of the tragedy, Oedipus once thought: 
 
(1) The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle killed Laius. 
 
At the time of thinking, Oedipus ignored that he (himself) was the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle. 
Sadly, a few years later, Tiresias was the bearer of bad news: “You’re the solver of the Sphinx’s 
riddle”—he said. So, Oedipus thought: 
 
(2) I killed Laius! 
 
(1) and (2) are about their thinker: Oedipus. Nevertheless, only (2) is a self-conscious thought. A 
theory of self-consciousness should identify the property that distinguishes (2) from (1). In addition, 
it should spell out the conditions under which thoughts like (2) instantiate that property. 
According to the rule account, all it takes to have a self-conscious thought like (2) is to think 
a thought that contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule (RR).1 
Unfortunately, the rule account has fallen into disgrace. Two reasons explain this situation. First, it 
has been argued that the rule account does not provide sufficient conditions for self-conscious thought.2 
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Second, several authors hold that the rule account does not even provide necessary conditions for self-
conscious thought.3  
Philosophers have been quick to devise alternative views. A conservative strategy is to 
supplement the reflexive rule with various forms of non-conceptual experience.4 Another reaction is 
to posit a level of thought that is not governed by a reflexive rule.5 A different approach grants that 
RR fixes the reference of the first person but insists that RR does not explain self-conscious 
thought.6 A more radical response denies that the first person refers.7 And other philosophers have 
tried to ground self-conscious thought in a primitive relation of self-acquaintance.8  
It would go beyond the limits of this paper to examine each of these views. I will pursue a 
more modest goal. I will argue that this summary dismissal of the rule account is partly unjustified. 
There is a version of the rule account that can explain the epistemic property that distinguishes (2) 
from (1). This property is GUARANTEE. This version of the rule account can also rebut many 
influential objections. Thus, although I won’t demonstrate that the rule account is true, my 
arguments should motivate the detractors of this view to take it more seriously.    
Before we proceed, let me introduce some important assumptions. I shall assume that 
thoughts are episodic mental representations. In this framework, mental representations realize folk-
psychological attitudes like beliefs or desires. I will remain neutral as to how the realization relation 
is to be understood. I will suppose that thoughts are complexes of concepts. On this view, concepts 
are constituents of mental representations that can be shared by different subjects and can 
participate in inference. One can construe thoughts either as representations in a Fodorian language 
of thought9 or as internalized linguistic utterances.10 What I shall say here is compatible with any of 
these views. Some authors characterize concepts as Fregean senses and thoughts as complexes of 
Fregean senses.11 The current framework is certainly different from those approaches. Luckily, most 
of what I shall say here could be translated into a Fregean framework. I will use italics to mention 
concepts (I) and quotation marks to mention linguistic expressions (“I”).  
The article is structured as follows. I start with a characterization of GUARANTEE (Section I). 
Next, I introduce the rule account and dispel some common misunderstandings of it (Section II). 
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After that, I argue that the rule account provides necessary and sufficient conditions for 
GUARANTEE (Section III). Finally, I revisit Anscombe’s circularity objection (Section IV) and the 
case of inserted thoughts (Section V). 
 
I. Self-Consciousness and Guarantee 
 
“Self-consciousness” and “self-conscious” are used as technical terms in philosophy. The former 
refers to a capacity, as when we say that some subjects have self-consciousness. The latter refers to a 
property of some mental states and events. Our focus is a specific property denoted by “self-
conscious”: GUARANTEE.12 
 Consider Oedipus’ thought (2). This thought includes a token of the I-concept. It is widely 
held that all tokens of I are guaranteed to refer.13 We can explicate this idea as follows: 
 
DE JURE REFLEXIVITY. If a thinker, S, produces a token of I, the referent of that token is S. 
 
DE JURE REFLEXIVITY distinguishes the way the I-concept refers from the way other concept-types 
refer. Suppose that Hume used the name David in soliloquy to think about himself. The fact that 
Hume used David to refer to himself is not part of how names refer. After all, names can refer to 
entities other than their users. The same holds for the concept-types underlying demonstratives and 
definite descriptions. Although they can be used to refer to their thinker, that is not part of how they 
refer. Let us follow Peacocke and say that the concepts underlying names, demonstratives, and 
definite descriptions can only be de facto reflexive; the I-concept is de jure reflexive.14 
Self-conscious thoughts include a concept-type that is de jure reflexive. It is however unclear 
how the concept of de jure reflexivity relates to self-consciousness. An epistemic ingredient is missing. 
What is the missing ingredient? 
Here is an influential view. If a thought is self-conscious, its thinker must know that she herself 
is the thinker of that thought.15 Unfortunately, there are many controversies about the nature of 
Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy 
   
 4 
knowledge. We would ideally seek an account of self-conscious thoughts that has broad appeal, 
whatever one’s conception of knowledge. Furthermore, the controversies about the nature of 
knowledge leave open an interesting possibility: there could be situations in which Oedipus’ thought 
(2) realizes a merely true belief. However, (2) might still count as self-conscious in a philosophically 
interesting sense.16 
These are not knockdown arguments against the knowledge approach. However, they give 
us some reason to explore an alternative. Here is a proposal. If a subject has a self-conscious 
thought, there are questions that she cannot raise concerning the referent of her own tokens of I 
while having that thought. Given that thinking a thought and asking a question take time, the phrase 
“while having that thought” should be understood as the lapse of time from the formation of the 
thought to the period of time during which the thought is held in the same stream of consciousness. 
So, if a subject has a self-conscious thought, she cannot ask Does ‘I’ refer to me? during that lapse of 
time. Let us use the phrase “questions of reference” to denote questions of this form. So, we have 
the erotetic criterion of GUARANTEE (from the Ancient Greek erōtētikós, which means “pertaining to 
questions”): If a thought has GUARANTEE, the thinker of that thought cannot raise questions of 
reference concerning her tokens of the I-concept while having that thought.17 
The erotetic criterion hinges on the negation of a modal operator: “cannot.” This modality is 
ambiguous. We will construe GUARANTEE as relying on two complementary interpretations of that 
modality: a normative reading and a constitutive reading.  
According to a normative reading, if a subject’s thought has GUARANTEE, that subject cannot 
coherently raise questions of reference while having that thought. Were the subject to raise those 
questions while having that thought, she would be irrational. Simultaneously thinking a thought that 
features a token of I and wondering whether I refers to me yields an incoherent combination of 
attitudes. In doing so, I am simultaneously treating the question of whether I is reflexive as “closed” 
(because I am employing a concept-type that leaves no room for non-reflexive uses) and as “open” 
(by asking whether I refers to me). And that seems irrational.18 
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According to a constitutive reading, if a subject’s thought has GUARANTEE, a subject who raises 
questions of reference while having that thought does not count as having an I-thought. It is 
possible for some attitudes to display some form of irrationality without thereby being disqualified 
as instances of the relevant type. For example, it may be irrational to hold a belief on the basis of 
scant evidence. Yet, this does not disqualify the attitude as a token of the belief-type. Something 
different happens with Oedipus’ thought (2). Were Oedipus to ask questions of reference while 
thinking (2), those questions would disqualify (2) as a token of an I-thought. Think about it. Suppose 
that Oedipus were to think (2) and asked: Does ‘I’ refer to me? In this scenario, most of us would 
conclude that, either ‘I’ in (2) is not a token of the I-concept, or that Oedipus does not really master 
the I-concept.19  
To be sure, a lot more could be said in relation to the erotetic criterion. However, the 
previous remarks suffice to provide a characterization of GUARANTEE: 
 
GUARANTEE. A thought, T, has GUARANTEE if and only if: 
(1) T has a token of a concept-type, C, that is de jure reflexive. 
(2) A thinker of T cannot (coherently) raise questions of reference relative to C while having 
T.    
 
GUARANTEE captures a key difference between (2) and (1). The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle refers to 
Oedipus, the thinker of (1). However, the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle is only de facto reflexive. Moreover, 
there are circumstances in which Oedipus thinks (1) and he can (coherently) raise questions of 
reference while thinking (1). He could (coherently) ask: Does ‘the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle’ refer to me? 
This would happen if Oedipus ignores the identity: I = the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle. By contrast, 
(2) features a token of a de jure reflexive concept. Moreover, when Oedipus thinks (2), he cannot 
(coherently) raise questions of reference while thinking (2). He cannot (coherently) ask: Does ‘I’ refer 
to me? Therefore, the erotetic criterion captures a key epistemic difference between (2) and (1).20 
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 The rule account has often been dismissed. One reason for this summary dismissal is that 
“self-conscious” can be used to pick out different epistemic properties. In my view, the rule account 
cannot explain (without further conceptual tools) these other epistemic properties. I will argue, 
however, that the rule account can explain GUARANTEE, at least in the minimal sense of providing 
necessary and sufficient conditions for GUARANTEE. We can better appreciate the scope of the rule 
account by contrasting GUARANTEE with another epistemic property: IMMUNITY TO ERROR 
THROUGH MISIDENTIFICATION relative to the first person (IEM). 
 Some philosophers characterize self-conscious thoughts as thoughts that are IEM.21 Given 
that “self-conscious” is a technical term, I have nothing against this approach. Nevertheless, IEM 
should be sharply distinguished from GUARANTEE.22  We introduced GUARANTEE by comparing the 
epistemic profile of the I-concept with the epistemic profiles of the concepts underlying our uses of 
definite descriptions, proper names, and demonstratives. We noted that the I-concept is de jure 
reflexive. Moreover, all thoughts featuring the I-concept exclude some questions of reference. By 
contrast, IEM cannot be introduced by comparing different concept-types. We have to compare 
thoughts flanked by different predicative concepts based on different epistemic sources. For 
example, we can compare my thought I have a headache (based on a pain experience) with my thought 
I am wearing a blue shirt (based on a visual experience of a reflection in a mirror). The first thought 
excludes the following possibility: that the property lx(x has a headache) is instantiated and the 
bearer of that property is different from the referent of I (me). By contrast, the second thought 
leaves open the following possibility: that the property lx(x is wearing a blue shirt) is instantiated 
and the bearer of that property is different from the referent of I (me).23 
It is easy to conflate GUARANTEE and IEM because both of them exclude identity mistakes. 
Nevertheless, GUARANTEE and IEM highlight two different ways in which identity mistakes can be 
excluded. GUARANTEE excludes the possibility that a thinker can (coherently) take the referent of 
her own token of I to be different from herself. IEM excludes a different possibility: that a thinker 
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can (coherently) take the bearer of a property that seems to be instantiated to be different from the 
referent of her own token of I (her).  
An account of GUARANTEE may be part of an account of IEM. However, an account of 
GUARANTEE is not sufficient to explain IEM. An account of IEM should consider the way I-thoughts 
that are IEM are grounded in some epistemic sources. This goes beyond GUARANTEE, which also 
holds for I-thoughts that are not IEM. In our original example, Oedipus’ thought (2) was based on 
Tiresias’ testimony. Given that Tiresias might be talking of somebody else, the bearer of the property 
lx(x is the killer of Laius) could have been different from the referent of I (Oedipus). Yet, (2) still 
has an important epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts. 
 
II. The Rule Account 
 
Many writers have appealed to a reflexive rule to explain some epistemic property of self-conscious 
thoughts. In this section, I introduce (what I take to be) the strongest version of this family of views. 
This version is restricted to GUARANTEE and it relies on a specific formulation of the reflexive rule. 
 
THE RULE ACCOUNT. A thought, T, has GUARANTEE if and only if T contains a token of a 
concept-type that is governed by RR: 
 
RR  A token of I in a thinking stands for the subject of that thinking. 
 
Let us work with a picture of subjects as possessors of mental states and events.24 For our current 
purposes, we can remain neutral on the nature of subjects. The rule account has two components. 
The first component is RR. This rule states the relation that a subject must stand in to a token of I in 
order to be the referent of that token.25 RR tells us that a token of I refers to the subject who stands 
in the thinking relation to that token. Second, the rule account relies on the concept of being 
Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy 
   
 8 
governed by a rule. To a first approximation, being governed by a rule contrasts with accidentally 
conforming to a rule. This contrast will allow us to block a pervasive objection (Sections III.2-III.5). 
It has been argued that the rule account does not provide necessary and sufficient conditions 
for self-conscious thoughts (Introduction). Our formulation of the rule account challenges this view. 
A common tendency is to think that the rule account is meant to explain epistemic properties other 
than GUARANTEE. Our formulation preempts this interpretation.26 In the remainder of this section, 
we will revisit other lines of criticism. More substantial objections will be discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
OBJECTION 1. It might be objected that the rule account leaves out some important capacities 
that underlie self-conscious thoughts, including various ways of gaining self-concerning information 
(for example, proprioception, introspection), our ability to self-locate in space,27 our awareness of 
other subjects,28 and our consciousness of ourselves as agents.29 
 REPLY. It is true that the rule account does not mention any of these capacities. The rule 
account holds that those capacities are not relevant to explain GUARANTEE. However, it does not 
follow that those capacities are philosophically unimportant. They could be cited in other 
explanatory projects. For example, they could feature as acquisition conditions, that is, conditions that 
enable the acquisition of the capacity to think I-thoughts. They could be background conditions, 
conditions underlying the employment of first-person concepts. And they could be sources of 
justification, that is, epistemic sources for the self-ascription of properties. 
 OBJECTION 2. It is widely held that the rule account assumes that self-consciousness is 
language dependent. This overlooks the possibility that some forms of self-consciousness are non-
linguistic.30 
 REPLY. It is true that the rule account has often been developed in the context of linguistic 
theories of the first-person pronoun.31 Moreover, a commitment to the language dependence of self-
conscious thought is implicit in some works that emphasize the centrality of a reflexive rule.32 
Notice, however, that our formulation of the rule account does not entail that all self-consciousness is 
language dependent. Our formulation is restricted to self-conscious thoughts. So, we can leave open 
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the question of whether I-thoughts are language dependent. What about non-conceptual forms of 
self-consciousness? Given that we have made use of de jure reflexive concepts in our characterization 
of GUARANTEE, our account certainly precludes the existence of non-conceptual representations 
endowed with GUARANTEE. However, “self-conscious” has been used in many other ways in the 
literature.33 Crucially, our account does not preclude the existence of non-conceptual forms of self-
consciousness given other specifications of “self-conscious.”   
 OBJECTION 3. Some philosophers read the rule account as making the false prediction that all 
thoughts featuring a reflexive concept must be self-conscious.34 However, this prediction is falsified 
by Anscombe’s intriguing case of “A”-users.35 In her thought experiment, speakers have an “A” 
stamped on the inside of their own wrists. Each speaker relies on the observation of her own “A” to 
report her own actions. Interestingly, “A” is reflexive: If a speaker, S, produces a token of “A,” the 
referent of that token is S. However, a subject could mistake an “A” stamped on someone else’s 
wrist for her own “A.” Therefore, Anscombe concluded that utterances featuring tokens of “A” do 
not express self-conscious thoughts. 
REPLY. Anscombe’s thought experiment does not refute the rule account. As several authors 
have pointed out, the rule that governs “A” makes a non-eliminable reference to perception. A more 
accurate formulation of that rule would go as follows: Any token of “A” refers to the subject on whose inside 
wrist she sees an “A” inscribed. By contrast, RR makes no reference to perception.36 The only way of 
refuting the rule account is to show that RR does not explain GUARANTEE. This is much harder, 
though. 
 We will consider more substantial objections as we proceed. I hope to have shown, however, 
that the rule account is more plausible than it is often taken to be. In the next section, I argue that 
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III. Guarantee Explained 
 
GUARANTEE has normative and constitutive dimensions (Section I). In this section, we will show 
how the rule account explains both of them. 
III.1. Normativity. A thinker of (2) cannot coherently raise questions of reference while thinking 
(2). The rule account offers an elegant explanation of this fact. 
When Oedipus thought (1), it was an accident that the referent of a token of the solver of the 
Sphinx’s riddle was the same as the thinker of (1). Indeed, in many nearby situations, the referent of a 
token of the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle is not the same as the thinker of (1). As an illustration, Jocasta 
could have easily thought (1). In that scenario, the referent of a token of the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle 
would not be the same as the thinker of (1). By contrast, when Oedipus thought (2), it was not an 
accident that the referent of a token of I was the same as the thinker of (2). Indeed, there are no 
situations in which the referent of a token of I is not the same as the thinker of (2). Had Jocasta 
thought (2), the referent of that token of I would have been the same as the thinker of (2).   
 We have here an “asymmetry of accidentality.” In (1), the thinker/referent identity is an 
accident. In (2), the thinker/referent identity is not an accident. If there are situations in which a 
token of a concept-type can refer to someone other than its thinker, then its thinker could have 
opportunities to coherently raise questions of reference in relation to tokens of that concept-type. For 
example, if Oedipus ignores that he (himself) is the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle, it is not irrational 
for him to ask: Does ‘the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle’ refer to me? By contrast, if there are no situations in 
which a token of a concept-type can refer to someone other than its thinker, it will be impossible for 
its thinker to coherently raise questions of reference in relation to tokens of that concept-type (while 
having the corresponding I-thought). So, the first step to offer an account of GUARANTEE is to 
identify a property of the concept-type I that explains why tokens of I must refer to their thinker.  
 We have seen that the I-concept requires that the referent of all its tokens be the same as its 
thinker. The I-concept is de jure reflexive (Section 1). By contrast, there is nothing in the solver of the 
Sphinx’s riddle that requires that the referent of all its tokens be the same as its thinker. Thus, tokens 
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of the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle can only be de facto reflexive. The rule account marks out the de jure/de 
facto difference by associating the I-concept with a rule that codifies the de jure reflexivity of the I-
concept. This rule is RR: If a token of I in a thinking stands for the subject of that thinking, then 
Oedipus’ act of thinking I guarantees that the referent of I is the same as Oedipus. Given RR, it is 
not an accident that the referent of I is the same as its thinker. Indeed, there are no situations in 
which a token of I refers to someone other than its thinker. Therefore, producing a token of a 
concept-type that is governed by RR will automatically deprive its thinker of any opportunity to 
coherently raise any question of reference concerning tokens of that concept-type (while having the 
corresponding I-thought). Were the subject to raise any question of reference while thinking a token 
of I, she would be irrational. 
In sum, RR explains why raising questions of reference while thinking a token of I is 
irrational. Our next task is to explain why it is constitutive of I-thoughts that subjects do not raise 
questions of reference concerning their own tokens of the I-concept. We will introduce our 
explanation by reflecting on the relationship between RR and the cognitive role of the I-concept. 
III.2. The Cognitive Role Problem. It has been argued that RR mischaracterizes the cognitive role 
of the I-concept. The argument goes as follows. If RR adequately characterizes the cognitive role of 
the I-concept, an I-thinker cannot raise questions of reference in relation to RR. But an I-thinker can 
easily raise questions of reference in relation to RR. So, RR does not adequately characterize the 
cognitive role of the I-concept. 
John Campbell offers a telling version of this objection. On his view, RR is vulnerable to an 
“Open Question Argument”: 
 
Moore famously said that any naturalistic reduction of goodness to a property F can be refuted by 
remarking that the question, “But is F good?” will always make sense.37 Similarly, given any attempt 
to characterize the mode of presentation expressed by the first person, say as a mode of presentation 
X, the question, “But am I X?,” will generally make sense.38 
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Suppose that, whenever a thinker produces a token of I, she explicitly represents RR: A token of ‘I’ in 
a thinking stands for the subject of that thinking. In this case, questions of reference will generally make 
sense: Am I the subject of that thinking? But those questions do not generally make sense. 
 Many philosophers have been moved by this type of argument. A natural way out is to deny 
that RR must figure as a description employed in thought. If RR does not figure as a description in 
thought, subjects won’t have any opportunities to raise questions of reference about RR.39 
 A non-descriptivist formulation of the rule account should spell out the contribution of RR 
to the cognitive role of the I-concept. Otherwise, we would have failed to provide an explanation of 
GUARANTEE. To the best of my knowledge, we still lack a non-descriptivist formulation of the rule 
account. In the remainder of this section, I will fill this gap. First, I will argue that the rule account is 
consistent with the denial of the key assumption of Campbell’s objection: subjects do not need to 
explicitly represent RR. Second, I will argue that the denial of the descriptivist assumption follows 
from the letter of the rule account plus some platitudes about being governed by a rule.  
III.3. Producing Tokens of ‘I.’ Our first task is to show that the rule account is consistent with the 
denial of the claim that RR figures as a description in thought. To this end, we will introduce two 
cognitive constraints on the implementation of RR: a “production constraint” (Section III.3) and a 
“consumption constraint” (Section III.4). After that, we will derive those constraints from the rule 
account (Section III.5). 
Campbell does not explain how and when the Moorean question could arise. Therefore, we 
will need to make some assumptions. It may be helpful to situate I-thoughts in our mental life. 
Paradigmatic I-thoughts are responses to input conditions. Suppose that you have a headache. In 
this case, it is appropriate for you to think I have a headache. Imagine that you are looking at a city 
map of New York City with a red dot that says: “You are here.” In this scenario, it may be 
appropriate for you to think I’m close to Central Park. One way of fleshing out Campbell’s objection is 
to assume that the subject must explicitly represent RR whenever she moves from an input 
condition to a corresponding I-thought. Consider a “consultation model.” On this model, self-
referring is a complex process. Given an appropriate input condition, the subject entertains RR: A 
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token of ‘I’ in a thinking stands for the subject of that thinking. This representation leads our subject to 
identify a suitable subject that can stand in the thinking relation to a token of I. When the task is 
executed, the self-referring act is completed. 
The consultation model faces obvious problems. To begin with, it could be argued that the 
consultation step cannot be executed, even in principle. It might be insisted that, in order to identify 
a subject that can stand in the thinking relation to a token of I, one must already think an I-
thought.40 But, if the consultation step is deemed necessary to follow RR, we are led to an infinite 
regress. Suppose now that the regress could be blocked, maybe by positing a mental demonstrative 
that refers to the thinker: This is the subject of thinking.41 In this case, the consultation model would still 
yield the wrong prediction: I-thinkers should find it easy to raise questions of reference about their 
own tokens of I. A subject who is in the business of identifying the subject of a token of I could 
easily ask: Does this token of ‘I’ refer to me? Am I the subject of thinking? Nevertheless, I-thinkers do not 
find it easy to raise questions of reference. Therefore, the consultation model does not explain 
GUARANTEE.42 
The good news is that the rule account neither mentions the explicit representation of RR, 
nor its consultation (Section II). Therefore, the rule account is consistent with a different picture. A 
natural alternative is to bypass the consultation step. The production constraint makes this idea 
explicit:  
  
PRODUCTION CONSTRAINT. When an input condition leads to an I-thought, the production of 
a token of I is underwritten by a basic, self-referring act. 
  
Producing an I-thought involves two acts: a self-referring act and the act of self-ascribing a property. 
A satisfactory account of I-thoughts should say something about these two types of acts. However, 
only self-referring acts are relevant in this context. A self-referring act is an act of producing a token 
of the I-concept. Suppose now that self-referring is not a complex process that includes a 
“consultation step”. Suppose further that there is no other activity mediating the production of the 
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self-referring act. Given these assumptions, the self-referring act is psychologically basic in a sense 
that is familiar from the philosophy of action. 
 Let us say that an act, A, is psychologically basic if and only if 1) A features in psychological 
explanations, but 2) A cannot be meaningfully factorized as the interplay of simpler, psychological 
acts. Baking a cake is not psychologically basic in this sense. Baking a cake is a complex act that can 
be meaningfully factorized as the interplay of simpler, psychological acts like breaking the eggs, 
mixing the ingredients, and so on. Baking a cake is therefore constituted by simpler, psychological 
acts. On pain of regress, baking a cake should bottom out in psychological acts that cannot be 
further factorized as the interplay of simpler, psychological acts. The suggestion is that, unlike 
baking a cake, self-referring acts cannot be meaningfully factorized as the interplay of simpler, 
psychological acts. So, following RR consists in performing a psychologically basic, self-referring act. 
This approach is consistent with the rule account. RR tells us that a token of I in a thinking stands for 
the subject of that thinking (Section II). Crucially, a basic, self-referring act suffices to put the subject 
in a thinking relation with a token of I.  
We are now in a position to answer Campbell’s objection. If an I-thinker can follow RR by 
performing a psychologically basic, self-referring act, she does not need to find out a suitable subject 
to stand in the thinking relation to a token of I. Therefore, there is no way in which our subject 
could possibly fail to find a referent or mistake the referent of I for someone else. In addition, the 
production of an I-thought won’t generate any opportunities to raise questions of reference 
concerning tokens of I.43 
III.4. Consuming Tokens of ‘I.’ One might think that the production constraint is sufficient for 
GUARANTEE. This view might gain some traction when we contrast the perspective of an I-thinker 
with the perspective of an external observer.44 For an external observer, the I-thinker is always a 
perceptual object that might fail to be “there” or be mistaken for someone (or something) else. So, 
an external observer can have many opportunities to ask whether a token of I refers to this or that 
subject. The perspective of the I-thinker is different. From the perspective of the I-thinker, the 
Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy 
   
 15 
referent of I is always “there”. There is no “distance” between the self-referring act and the referent. 
If I think I, the referent of I can only be me. Who else? 
This reasoning is too hasty, though. To see why, let us consider an insightful remark from 
Anscombe: 
 
If you are a speaker who says “I,” you do not find out what is saying “I.” You do not for example 
look to see what apparatus the noise comes out of and assume that that is the sayer; or frame the 
hypothesis of something connected with it that is the sayer. If that were in question, you could doubt 
whether anything was saying “I.”45 
 
Although Anscombe’s observation concerns the pronoun “I,” it can be easily generalized to the I-
concept. The consultation model construed self-referring as a complex process in which the 
prospective I-thinker had to find out the subject of her token of I. The production constraint 
removed the consultation step. Yet, nothing we have said so far excludes the possibility that the I-
thinker performs a self-referring act but decides to interrupt the flow of thinking in order to find out 
what is thinking I. In this hypothetical scenario, it should be easy for the I-thinker to ask: Does ‘I’ refer 
to me? Were this question raised, her I-thought would lack GUARANTEE. Indeed, it would not 
plausibly count as an instance of an I-thought.46 
 What would it take for a subject not to raise questions of reference just after having 
produced an I-thought? Let us explore a minimal proposal: self-conscious I-thinkers must be wired 
in such a way that they do not raise questions of reference immediately after having produced their 
own I-thoughts. If we wanted to design a subject whose thoughts satisfy GUARANTEE, we should 
design her in such a way that she proceeds—in her subsequent doings—on the assumption that the 
referent of her own tokens of I is the same as the I-thinker. This yields a consumption constraint: 
   
CONSUMPTION CONSTRAINT. I-thinkers are disposed to immediately engage in activities that 
trade on the identity of the referent of their own tokens of I with the I-thinker.  
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The phrase “trade on identity” is best understood with an example. Suppose that you make the 
following inference:  
 
Premise 1. Hesperus is F.  
Premise 2. Hesperus is G.  
Conclusion. So, Hesperus is both F and G.  
 
When you performed the inference, you relied on the co-reference of the two tokens of Hesperus. In 
other words, you did not need an identity premise connecting the first token of Hesperus in premise 1 
with the second token of Hesperus in premise 2: 
  
Premise 3. Hesperus is Hesperus.  
 
Now, suppose that the identity premise was needed. In this case, you would still need to rely on the 
co-reference of the two tokens of Hesperus in premise 3 with the tokens of Hesperus in premise 1 and 
premise 2 respectively. On pain of regress, there must be cases in which you simply rely on the co-
reference of concept-tokens without representing an identity premise. When that happens, we can 
say that your transition “trades on the identity” of the two co-referential concept-tokens. In these 
cases, you do not ask yourself whether the two concept-tokens are co-referential. You simply take 
for granted that they are.47  
The consumption constraint generalizes the concept of trading on identity in two ways. First, 
it applies it to the I-concept. Second, it extends it beyond the relation of co-reference. It does not 
only cover co-referential concept-tokens but also a token of the I-concept and subsequent activities 
performed by the referent of that token of the I-concept. (Please read “activities” in a sufficiently 
liberal way, including mental acts). Consider an example. Upon thinking I have a headache, an I-thinker 
can be led to massage her head or take a painkiller. In these cases, the I-thinker is proceeding on the 
assumption that the referent of her own token of I (in I have a headache) is the same as the I-thinker 
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who massages her head or takes a painkiller. By contrast, an Anscombean thinker who proceeds to 
find out what is thinking I is not disposed to immediately engage in activities that trade on the 
identity of the referent of her own token of I with the I-thinker. This unusual behavior will 
disqualify that thought as an I-thought.48  
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the rule account:  
 
 
          Production                Consumption   
Input     I-Thoughts   Activities trading on the identity of the 
Conditions        referent of I with the I-thinker  
       Underwritten by basic, 
self-referring acts  
governed by RR 
 
A headache   I have a headache   Taking a painkiller 
“You are here”   I’m close to Central Park  Thinking: So, I can’t be far from my hotel! 
  
 
Figure 1. The Rule Account. The production of I-thoughts is partly underwritten by basic, self-referring acts 
governed by RR. I-thinkers do not need to find out the referent of I and they are disposed to immediately engage 
in activities that trade on the identity of the referent of their tokens of I with the I-thinker. This model offers 
subjects no opportunities to raise questions of reference while having I-thoughts. Therefore, it explains why I-
thoughts satisfy GUARANTEE. 
 
III.5. Being Governed by RR. It is natural to construe the production and the consumption 
constraints as conditions on the implementation of the I-concept. Some readers might wonder whether 
these implementation constraints are relevant to a constitutive account of self-conscious I-thoughts. 
Notice that not all implementation conditions are irrelevant to address constitutive issues. 
The implementation conditions were introduced to provide an account of the cognitive role of the I-
concept. Assuming that this cognitive role is constitutive of the I-concept, the two implementation 
conditions are part of a constitutive account of the I-concept. On this view, having a self-conscious 
I-thought partly consists in producing a basic self-referring act and having a disposition to 
immediately engage in activities that trade on the identity of the referent of I and the I-thinker. Chip 
away any of these constraints and the subject of the corresponding thought will not count as 
genuinely thinking an I-thought. In the remainder of this section, I will derive these two constraints 
Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy 
   
 18 
from the letter of the rule account plus some widespread assumptions about the concept of being 
governed by a rule. This should dispel the temptation to think of the previous constraints as ad hoc. 
Recall the letter of the rule account: a thought, T, has GUARANTEE if and only if T contains a 
token of a concept-type that is governed by RR. The right-hand condition entails that no other rule 
(or combination of rules) is necessary for GUARANTEE. Otherwise, being governed by RR would not 
be sufficient for GUARANTEE. Models that posit the explicit representation and consultation of RR 
violate this requirement. 
Suppose that I-thinkers were wired in such a way that they had to consult RR in the process 
of producing an I-thought. Our I-thinkers would have to find out the subject of the prospective 
token of I in a complex process of self-referring. In this scenario, I-thinkers would not simply 
perform a self-referring act; they would self-refer by doing other things: consulting RR and finding 
out a subject. Therefore, it would be a mistake to say that their use of the I-concept was governed 
solely by RR. Instead, their use of the I-concept would be governed by RR plus the sum of rules that 
govern the act of consulting RR and the process of finding out a subject. But this would go against 
the letter of the rule account. The rule account holds that producing a thought that contains a token 
of a concept-type that is governed by RR is both necessary and sufficient for that thought to have 
GUARANTEE (Section II). 
When we take seriously the letter of the rule account, it seems to follow that nothing that 
falls short of a basic, self-referring act can implement RR to the exclusion of implementing other rules. RR 
tells us that all it takes for a subject to self-refer is to stand in a thinking relation to a token of I. 
Nothing else. The basic act of thinking I suffices to put the subject in a thinking relation to a token 
of I. If we held that self-referring is psychologically more complex, we would end up introducing 
further rules that govern the proper parts of the more complex psychological act. 
What about the consumption constraint? It is widely accepted that being governed by a rule is 
different from accidentally conforming to a rule. Suppose that Oedipus happened to blink while he was 
thinking I. Therefore, Oedipus’ token of I conformed to the blink-rule: Blink while producing a token of 
I. In this case, Oedipus’ token of I would have accidentally conformed to the blink-rule. (According to 
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my sources, Oedipus did not have the slightest tendency to blink whenever he produced a token of 
I.) 
The recent literature on rule following has sought to offer a principled distinction between 
accidentally conforming to a rule and being governed by a rule. This task is further complicated by 
the debate on meaning skepticism.49 I won’t engage in that debate. My aim is more modest. I will 
suggest that the consumption constraint is necessary to distinguish accidentally conforming to RR 
from being governed by RR. Even if we won’t provide a full-fledged account of what it takes to be 
governed by RR, our argument will enable us to derive the consumption constraint from the letter 
of the rule account. 
It is widely held that following a rule involves at least being disposed to proceed in certain 
ways.50 It is not easy to state in the abstract, for all rules, what those ways are. However, it is easy to 
identify, for specific rules, some of those ways. Someone who adds 2+4=6 should be disposed to 
treat 2+5=7 as right. Were our subject not disposed to treat 2+5=7 as right, we would have a good 
reason to think that her first arithmetical operation is not governed by the successor function. So, 
having this disposition seems necessary to count her arithmetic activities as being governed by the 
rule of addition. 
Something similar is true of I-thoughts. An Anscombean thinker who produces an I-thought 
but proceeds to find out what is thinking that thought is someone who is treating the referent of I as 
potentially different from the I-thinker. But RR precludes that the referent of I can be different from 
the I-thinker. Therefore, the Anscombean thinker is not proceeding in a way proper to someone 
whose tokens of I are governed by RR. This result strikes me as very intuitive. If we were to observe 
the behavior of the Anscombean thinker, we would conclude, either that she does not genuinely 
master RR, or that she is unwilling to commit herself to RR. So, in order to produce a token of I 
that is genuinely governed by RR, the I-thinker must have a disposition to immediately engage in 
activities that trade on the identity of the referent of her token of I with the I-thinker. In this respect, 
following RR is on a par with following other rules.51 
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III.6. Taking Stock. We have clarified the scope and theoretical commitments of the rule 
account. The rule account is not a theory of anything that philosophers have called “self-
consciousness.” It is an account of GUARANTEE. We have seen that the rule account provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions for GUARANTEE. Finally, the rule account does not say that I-
thinkers must explicitly represent RR. Indeed, explicitly representing RR is inconsistent with the 
letter of RR. In the final sections, I revisit two influential objections to the rule account. 
 
IV. The Circularity Objection 
 
Anscombe famously argued that accounts of first-person reference by means of reflexive rules are 
circular. Although she was mostly concerned with the pronoun “I,” her challenge can be generalized 
to the I-concept. Anscombe considered the following rule: “the word each one uses in speaking of 
himself.”52 The reflexive “himself” can be understood in two ways.53 On one reading, it applies to 
cases of reflexive reference that are not self-conscious. Suppose that Oedipus utters:  
 
(3) “The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle killed Laius.”  
 
In this case, Oedipus produced a token of “the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle” to speak of himself. 
Yet, he could (coherently) ask: Does “the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle” refer to me? On the second reading, 
the reflexive exclusively applies to cases of reflexive reference that are self-conscious (what 
Anscombe calls the “peculiar indirect reflexive”). As an illustration, suppose that Oedipus utters:  
 
(4) “I killed Laius.”  
 
In this case, Oedipus’ token of “I” expresses self-consciousness. However, this second reading 
makes an ineliminable use of “I” in the elucidation of “himself.” Therefore, the resulting account is 
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circular. Anscombe’s diagnosis generalizes to I-thoughts. It suffices to replace (3) with (1) and (4) 
with (2).54  
An initial response is that RR is different from Anscombe’s reflexive rule. Given that RR 
does not include any occurrence of “him-” or “herself,” it does not yield a circular explanation. Still, 
some readers might find our reply unsatisfactory. Indeed, some philosophers interpret Anscombe as 
introducing a more general, explanatory requirement: “The challenge is to provide an account of 
first-person reference that delivers genuine first-person reference without already assuming that very 
capacity in the explanation given.”55 The rule account posits basic, self-referring acts. Therefore, it 
does not satisfy Anscombe’s explanatory requirement. 
Let us use an analogy to evaluate the explanatory requirement. Suppose that we want to 
explain seeing. One option would be to posit a mechanism that produces a mental picture. If our 
hypothesis required an internal mechanism that “sees” the mental picture, the explanation would be 
circular. If seeing is not psychologically basic, this circularity would refute the proposed account of 
seeing. But notice the big “if.” It would be implausible to hold that any psychologically interesting 
capacity must satisfy Anscombe’s explanatory requirement. On pain of infinite regress, not all 
psychological capacities can be factorized as the interplay of more basic, psychological capacities.56 
In the absence of an argument to think the contrary, it is not unreasonable to hold that the capacity 
to self-refer is a basic, psychological capacity. 
The explanatory requirement has motivated a research program seeking to investigate the 
phylogenetic and developmental antecedents of our capacity to think I-thoughts.57 This research 
program is consistent with the claim that self-referring acts are psychologically basic. To illustrate, a 
pianist’s complex capacity to play the piano may bottom out in basic capacities like the capacity to 
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V. Inserted Thoughts 
 
Thought insertion is amongst the first rank symptoms of schizophrenia. In thought insertion, 
subjects have introspective access to some thoughts in their own stream of consciousness but insist 
that those thoughts are not their own. Some subjects also claim that those thoughts have been 
inserted into their minds by an external agent. One might wonder whether thought insertion 
challenges the rule account of GUARANTEE. I will concede that thought insertion is central to our 
understanding of various forms of non-conceptual self-consciousness. I will also grant that subjects 
who report inserted thoughts lack fully self-conscious I-thoughts. However, the phenomenon of 
thought insertion is consistent with the rule account of GUARANTEE. Before we reach these 
conclusions, we need to get a better understanding of this phenomenon. 
V.1. Thought Insertion and Guarantee. As Christopher Frith points out, “[t]he lack of 
introspective data concerning thought insertion and related symptoms is surprising.”58 Therefore, 
most philosophical discussions of this phenomenon rely on a limited collection of verbal reports. 
Unfortunately, existing reports lack detail and background; it is often unclear whether they are literal 
transcriptions or examiners’ notes from memory.59 With these caveats, let us introduce a widely 
discussed example: 
 
Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God.’ It’s just like my mind working, but it isn’t. They come 
from this chap, Chris. They are his thoughts.60 
 
Idealizing a bit, we can distinguish three types of thoughts in episodes of thought insertion:  
 
The disowned thought (Kill God). 
The disowning thought (That is not my thought).  
The explanatory thought (That thought comes from this chap, Chris).  
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The conjunction of these three thoughts is puzzling. However, many philosophers think that it is 
not incoherent. A dominant strategy has been to distinguish two strands in our concept of thought 
ownership. This distinction can be used to make sense of the combination of the disowned thought 
and the disowning thought.61 Very roughly, a subject can be aware of having the thought Kill God in 
her own stream of consciousness without also being aware of being the author of that thought. 
More generally, the subject can have a sense of ownership for the disowned thought without also 
having a sense of authorship for that same thought. Therefore, in thought insertion, subjects deny 
authorship without also denying ownership.62 There are many different ways of developing this 
strategy. However, these differences won’t affect our discussion.63  
 In an engaging discussion, Christopher Peacocke draws some morals that are in tension with 
the rule account of GUARANTEE.64 On his view, a schizophrenic subject could in principle experience 
a disowned thought of the form I am F and proceed to coherently ask: Does ‘I’ refer to me? Or does it 
refer to an external agent? Unfortunately, the rule account of GUARANTEE classifies this succession of 
thoughts as both incoherent and impossible. 
 I would like to resist the suggestion that the hypothetical schizophrenic subject has 
entertained a coherent and possible succession of thoughts. My starting intuition was that 
simultaneously thinking an I-thought and wondering whether I refers to me yields an incoherent 
combination of attitudes. In addition, I suggested that a subject who raises questions of reference 
while having an I-thought does not count as having an I-thought (Section I). Our hypothetical 
schizophrenic subject seems to lack a disposition to engage in those activities, for she treats the 
referent of I as (potentially) different from the I-thinker. Therefore, I would insist that she is either 
misusing the I-concept or is unwilling to commit herself to RR (Section III.5). 
 Thought insertion is consistent with the current analysis. I will grant that schizophrenic 
subjects have an impaired self-consciousness, given other specifications of “self-consciousness.” Their 
condition may have sources in non-conceptual forms of experience that prevent those subjects from 
enjoying fully self-conscious I-thoughts. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of thought insertion does 
not challenge the rule account of GUARANTEE. To this end, I will first reject Peacocke’s starting 
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assumption (Section V.2). After that, I will provide an interpretation of disowned I-thoughts that is 
consistent with those I-thoughts having GUARANTEE (Section V.3). At the end, I shall revisit 
Peacocke’s view (Section V.4). 
V.2. Peacocke’s Starting Assumption. Peacocke assumes that I-thoughts can feature among the 
disowned thoughts reported by schizophrenic subjects.65 Nevertheless, this assumption has been 
challenged.66 In the original example, the disowned thought is in the imperative mood: Kill God. 
Imperative thoughts do not feature any token of the I-concept. Therefore, they are not in tension 
with the rule account of GUARANTEE. As indicated above, we lack a sufficient number of detailed 
reports of disowned thoughts. However, none of the reports I am familiar with justifies the 
assumption that I-thoughts can be disowned. 
Some authors think of inserted thoughts as closely related to auditory verbal hallucinations 
in which subjects have experiences “of receiving a communication.”67 If we take the communication 
model seriously, it seems to exclude I-thoughts from the class of disowned thoughts. Imagine a 
subject who has the disowned thought: I hate you. Our subject could hardly understand the message 
if she were to take the token of I to refer to her herself. Instead, she should take the token of I to 
refer to someone else. More generally, messages that concern the receiver are not adequately “sent” 
via tokens of the first person, but rather via imperatives or representations featuring tokens of other 
pronouns, definite descriptions, and proper names. 
V.3. Disowned I-Thoughts and Guarantee. Let us examine now the possibility that there are 
disowned I-thoughts. So, we could have the following combination of thoughts: 
 
I am F (disowned thought).  
But this is not my thought (disowning thought).  
This thought comes from someone else (explanatory thought).  
 
Let us concede, for the sake of the argument, that this combination of thoughts is not incoherent. 
This raises the question: Does this combination of thoughts constitute a counterexample to the rule 
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account of GUARANTEE? My answer is “no.” Although these subjects have raised some questions, 
we lack reasons to believe that their questions concern the referent of their own token of I in the 
disowned thought. 
 To count as an Anscombean thinker, the subject should raise questions of reference 
concerning her own token of I in the disowned I-thought. In other words, our subject should treat 
the referent of her own token of I as (potentially) different from the I-thinker. However, it is not 
clear that the sort of interrogative behavior displayed by our putative schizophrenic subject concerns 
the referent of I. After all, a subject could raise all sorts of questions about a disowned I-thought 
without thereby wondering whether her token of I refers to her herself. Let us develop this point by 
considering Peacocke’s treatment of inserted thoughts. 
For Peacocke, the schizophrenic subject lacks an (apparent) action-awareness of thinking, 
that is, it does not seem to her that her thinking is something she is doing herself.68 Whatever view 
of mental action one advocates, this view entails that authored thoughts differ from unbidden 
thoughts, that is, those thoughts that just occur to us, like tunes stuck in one’s head or remembering 
an appointment just in time.69 Thus, the schizophrenic subject could be understood as follows:  
 
I am F (because this token of I stands in the thinking relation to me). However, this is not my 
thought (because this thought was not an exercise of my own mental agency). 
 
The action-awareness account is consistent with the rule account of GUARANTEE. To see why, it 
suffices to show that a subject who experiences an unbidden I-thought does not need to raise 
questions of reference concerning a token of I in her unbidden I-thought.  
Consider a case adapted from Stephens and Graham.70 Mary, a young mother concerned 
with her child’s welfare and her maternal responsibilities, finds herself thinking I am hurting my child. 
Although her I-thought was unbidden, Mary does not need to raise the question: Does ‘I’ refer to me? 
Indeed, it would be hard to understand Mary’s discomfort with her unbidden I-thought if she did 
not automatically take the token of I in her unbidden I-thought to refer to her herself. The unbidden 
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character of her I-thought does not prevent Mary from satisfying the consumption constraint. Upon 
thinking I am hurting my child Mary would probably hug her child in a protective manner or wonder: 
Why am I thinking that? Therefore, she would have engaged in some activities that trade on the 
identity of the referent of I and the I-thinker. Of course, the occurrence of the thought I am hurting 
my child will motivate Mary to raise many questions. Nevertheless, she does not need to raise 
questions of reference. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that her token of I has 
GUARANTEE.  
In sum, if the subject of an unbidden I-thought does not need to raise questions of reference 
concerning her own token of I, it is unclear why a schizophrenic subject who does not recognize her 
I-thought as an exercise of her own mental agency will raise questions of reference concerning a 
token of I in her disowned I-thought. 
It might be objected that thought insertion and unbidden thoughts are different. Suppose 
that we define “thinking” as an activity that brings about thoughts.71 Thus, a subject who denies 
authorship of her own thoughts is not just denying that her thought was not an exercise of her own 
mental agency. She is rather denying that she stands in the thinking relation to those thoughts. 
Notice, however, that this approach would presuppose the falsity of the action-awareness account. 
Moreover, it would turn the conjunction of the disowned thought and the disowning thought into 
an incoherent combination of thoughts. The subject would be simultaneously relying on the thinking 
relation between a token of I and herself in the disowned thought and denying that she stands in 
that thinking relation in the subsequent, disowning thought. However, we had assumed that the 
schizophrenic’s combination of thoughts is coherent.  
The same strategy can be applied to other interpretations of the experiential property that 
disowned thoughts lack. We can see whether lack of the relevant property is consistent with the 
subject’s satisfaction of the consumption constraint. If, lacking that experiential property, the subject 
can still engage in activities that trade on the identity of the referent of I and the I-thinker, we have 
some reason to believe that those I-thoughts still have GUARANTEE. 
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V.4. Peacocke’s Account Revisited. For Peacocke, the subject of a disowned thought “may know 
that occurrences of the first-person concept in thought express thoughts of a first-person type. 
Nevertheless, the first-person thoughts that occur to him during an experience of thought-insertion 
may not be ones of which he judges that the uses of the first person in them refer to him himself.”72 
Our discussion suggests a different interpretation. It is unclear whether subjects can have disowned 
I-thoughts. If they can, the disowned I-thoughts could still enjoy an epistemic status different from 
knowledge that that thought is of the first-person type. I dubbed the property that characterizes 
those I-thoughts “GUARANTEE”.  
Our view contradicts the letter but not the spirit of Peacocke’s view. Peacocke concedes that 
a subject can have knowledge of the referent of her own, unbidden I-thoughts.73 So, he could grant 
that GUARANTEE is preserved in the absence of occurrent (apparent) action-awareness. However, he 
could still hold that some I-thoughts with GUARANTEE fail to exhibit the full self-consciousness 
proper to the I-thoughts that are accompanied by (apparent) action-awareness. The abnormal 
experience of thought insertion may be seen as motivating the subject to put forward extraordinary 
hypotheses about the “distal origins” of her own thoughts. In doing so, the subject will have 
engaged in a higher-order inquiry with the I-thought as its subject matter (footnote 19). However, 
those hypotheses need not contradict three important facts: 1) that she stands in a thinking relation 
to her own tokens of I, 2) that those tokens of I refer to her herself, and 3) that she is disposed to 
engage in activities that trade on the identity of the referent of I and the I-thinker (as the example of 
Mary illustrates). As the putative “recipient” of those I-thoughts, the schizophrenic subject can still 




Very few philosophers endorse the rule account of self-conscious thought. I have argued that this 
attitude is partly unjustified. First, I have identified an epistemic property that the rule account can 
explain: GUARANTEE. Second, I have presented (what I take to be) the strongest version of the rule 
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account. Third, I have shown that this version of the rule account explains the normative and 
constitutive aspects of GUARANTEE. Fourth, I have argued that the rule account does not 
mischaracterize the cognitive role of the I-concept. Fifth, I have suggested that the rule account can 
respond to two influential objections. 
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